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COMMENT 
THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE  
TERRORISM ACT:  
THE NEED FOR A  
WHISTLEBLOWER EXCEPTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA or 
the Act) with the belief that certain commercial and institutional 
enterprises were in need of increased protection from violent attacks. 
The purpose of the Act was a limited one: to increase protections 
against perceived threats of terrorism. The statute’s language, 
however, is broad, and the bill was passed against a backdrop of 
concerns that its language would be used to curb traditionally 
protected activities, including whistleblowing. Because no court has 
extensively analyzed the Act, these concerns persist.  
The scope of this Comment is limited.1 It argues that, as AETA’s 
opponents have pointed out, a literal reading of AETA’s terms may 
force the conclusion that AETA prohibits certain acts of 
whistleblowing. A more scrutinizing analysis, however, reveals that 
the Act was never intended to halt acts of whistleblowing. AETA’s 
drafters, rather, were concerned solely with prohibiting domestic-
terrorism threats. Courts interpreting AETA must effectuate its full 
legislative intent by narrowing its application and resisting the 
temptation to apply the Act to whistleblowing, even if those actions 
fall within the technical language of the statute.  
In addition to effectuating the legislative intent of the statute, other 
factors also compel an interpretation of the Act that goes beyond its 
plain terms. First, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
                                                                                                                 
1 I have performed a more exacting analysis of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
elsewhere. See Michael A. Hill, Note, United States v. Fullmer and the Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act: “True Threats” to Activism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
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inspectors, animal enterprise employees, and the American public 
rely on whistleblowers to aid the enforcement of state and federal 
anti-cruelty laws. Second, there is an extensive and growing record of 
animal-cruelty and food-safety-law violations by factory farms, 
slaughterhouses, and processing plants. Because of the USDA’s poor 
record of enforcement,2 a history of retaliation against insiders who 
speak out, and an industry-wide refusal to self-regulate,3 the 
American public is dependant on whistleblowers to protect the 
integrity of America’s food supply.4 
I. THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM ACT 
A. Brief History of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
Critics have questioned the Act’s scope and breadth since its 
inception.5 In 1992, after approximately two decades of antagonistic 
relations between animal-protection advocates and medical 
researchers, Congress enacted the Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
(AEPA).6 AEPA made it a federal crime to use interstate commerce to 
cause a physical disruption to the functioning of an animal 
enterprise.7 The legislative intent was clear: to protect certain 
commercial and institutional enterprises from threats of domestic 
terrorism.8 The language used to carry out this aim was less clear, 
however. AEPA defined an “animal enterprise” as any organization 
classifiable as either: 
(A) a commercial or academic enterprise that uses or sells 
animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber 
production, agriculture, education, research, or testing;  
                                                                                                                 
2 See discussion at infra notes 170–90. 
3 See discussion at infra notes 190–201. 
4 See discussion at infra notes 202–219. 
5 See Laura G. Kniaz, Comment, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the 
Underground Railroad, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 765, 819–21 (1995) (noting that an earlier version of 
AEPA, entitled the Farm Animals and Research Facilities Protection Act, met resistance on 
various fronts when it was introduced to Congress, including that it was duplicative of state 
criminal laws, and that its breadth and scope of application were undefined). 
6 Pub. L. 102-346, 106 Stat. 928 (1992) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)). 
7 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)–(2) (2006).  
8 See H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(II), at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816, 816 
(“The purpose is to protect enterprises using animals from domestic terrorism by individuals or 
groups who object to the use of animals by medical researchers or commercial enterprises.”); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(I), at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805 (“[The 
Act] is intended to . . . protect[] persons employed at such facilities from acts of violence and 
destruction.”). 
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(B) a zoo, aquarium, animal shelter, pet store, breeder, furrier, 
circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive animal event; or 
(C) any fair or similar event intended to advance agricultural 
arts or sciences.9  
This expansive definition did not include any additional 
qualifications, like a requirement that the enterprise employ a 
threshold number of employees or devote a certain percentage of their 
efforts to the use of animals.10 Because of the lack of clarifying 
language, AEPA was potentially applicable to individuals or 
companies who use animals or animal products in only a limited 
capacity.11 
In addition to broadly defining an animal enterprise, Congress 
further complicated the statute’s interpretation by relying on the 
ambiguous term “physical disruption” as the triggering conduct.12 
Despite the fact that AEPA’s legislative history had previously 
established that whistleblowers were not the bill’s target, the term 
“physical disruption” left room for interpretation.13 Specifically, the 
House Judiciary Committee recognized that the term was susceptible 
to multiple, conflicting interpretations.14 The Committee expressed 
concerns that, without greater clarification, AEPA could be used to 
prosecute whistleblowers. 
Regulators, humane societies, and labor unions rely on 
whistleblowers and legitimate undercover investigations to 
police conditions at food and fiber processing facilities and 
determine compliance with animal welfare and labor 
laws. . . . The ambiguous term “physical disruption” is not 
defined, and could be construed to make criminal 
whistleblowing activity that results in a facility being shut 
down by regulators or protests. At best, this would have 
chilled whistleblowing; at worst, it could have resulted in 
actual prosecutions of whistleblowers. The bill reported by 
the Judiciary Committee is intended to avoid criminalizing 
                                                                                                                 
9 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(1)(A)–(C). 
10 Id. 
11 See H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(II), at 2 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816 
(seeking to amend the bill to restrict coverage to specific entities most likely to be subjected to 
acts of violence). 
12 Animal Enterprise Control Act, Pub. L. 102-346, 106 Stat. 928 (1992). 
13 See H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(I), at 3 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805 
(“Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to affect or limit the exercise of any right granted by 
State or Federal whistleblower protection laws”). 
14 H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(II), at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816. 
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whistleblowing activity and legitimate undercover 
investigations.15  
As a result, Congress followed the Committee’s recommendation 
and defined “physical disruption.”16 But the definition failed to fully 
remedy the statute’s ambiguity.17 The definition provided only that 
“the term ‘physical disruption’ does not include any lawful disruption 
that results from lawful public, governmental, or animal enterprise 
employee reaction to the disclosure of information about an animal 
enterprise.”18 Congress, however, did not include any illustration of 
what constituted a “lawful disruption.”19 Thus, the definition failed to 
provide the necessary clarity, and concerns about the statute’s scope 
remained.20  
On November 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signed 
AETA21 into law. AETA is a controversial amendment that expands 
AEPA in three fundamental ways. First, it replaces the term “physical 
disruption” with the broader term “interfering.”22 Second, it increases 
the number of entities covered by AETA to include not only the 
animal enterprise itself but also “any real or personal property of a 
person or entity having a connection to, relationship with, or 
transactions with an animal enterprise.”23 Third, it creates an 
independent source of liability for any individual who, by interfering 
with an animal enterprise, places a person in reasonable fear of death 
or bodily injury.24 AETA also retains the broad definition of “animal 
enterprise.”25 
B. The Potential Effect on Whistleblowers 
Prior to AETA’s enactment, critics feared that a plain, technical 
reading of AETA would convert traditional acts of whistleblowing 
                                                                                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Animal Enterprise Control Act, Pub. L. 102-346, 106 Stat. 928 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 43(d)(2)). 
17 See id.  
18 Id. 
19 The Animal Enterprise Protection Act has withstood a facial constitutional challenge on 
vagueness grounds, however. See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 153 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he term ‘physical disruption’ has a well-understood, common definition.”). 
20 See generally Kniaz, supra note 5 (discussing debates regarding AEPA’s scope and 
breadth). 
21 18 U.S.C. § 43. 
22 Id. § 43(a)(1). 
23 Id. § 43(a)(2)(A). 
24 Id § 43(a)(2)(B). The statute’s language does not specifically require that the person 
placed in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury have any connection to an animal enterprise. 
See id. 
25 Id. § 43(d)(1)(A)–(C); see also supra text accompanying note 9. 
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into a federal offense.26 Like the term “physical disruption,” the term 
“interfering” is capable of multiple, conflicting interpretations. Courts 
have concluded that “[t]o ‘interfere’ is to ‘oppose, intervene, hinder, 
or prevent.’”27 The legal-dictionary definition of “interfere” is equally 
broad. To interfere is “[t]o check; hamper; hinder; infringe; encroach; 
trespass; disturb; intervene; intermeddle; interpose. To enter into, or 
take part in, the concerns of others.”28 Moreover, courts have 
interpreted “interfere” as pertaining to both conduct and speech.29 
Under any of the above interpretations, it is plausible that an 
individual who exposes the wrongdoings of an animal enterprise for 
the purpose of imposing sanctions has intentionally “interfered” with 
the enterprise. 
AETA provides that whoever interferes with an animal enterprise 
and causes damage in excess of ten-thousand dollars to property, 
which includes the removal of animals or records, has satisfied the 
elements of the Act.30 In many instances, the only evidence of 
criminal or regulatory violations exists in these records, which a 
whistleblower must then remove to prove that a violation has 
occurred.31 In other cases, the best evidence of wrongdoing lies in the 
physical condition of the animal itself.32 If an individual removes 
property in the form of records or animals from an animal enterprise 
for the purpose of exposing wrongdoing, it is conceivable that the 
elements of the Act have been met.33 
Concerns that AETA would be used by law enforcement to 
prohibit well-intentioned acts dominated congressional hearings. 
                                                                                                                 
26 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H8593–94 (2006) (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich) 
(arguing that AETA’s language chills speech and potentially prohibits whistleblowing that 
interferes with an animal enterprise).  
27 United States v. Willfong, 274 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing WEBSTER'S NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 704 (3d College ed. 1998)).  
28 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (6th ed. 1990). 
29 See, e.g., Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 381 (D. Conn. 1988), aff’d 862 F.2d 432 
(2d Cir. 1988) (invalidating a portion of the Hunter Harassment Act that prohibited interfering 
with the lawful pursuit or preparation or hunting because it encompassed both acts and speech). 
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(A). 
31 See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP ET AL., Head Injury Experiments on Primates at the 
University of Pennsylvania, in THE HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL 
CHOICE 177, 178 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Head Injuries] (describing the theft of documents at 
the University of Pennsylvania that revealed callous researchers performing experiments on 
baboons, which was a major impetus for the 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act). 
32 See, e.g., Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934, 
936 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that the physical condition of the monkeys used in experiments 
indicated numerous violations of animal cruelty laws); see also James J. Kilpatrick, Caged in 
Poolesville, WASH. POST, May 12, 1986, at A15 (describing the conditions in the Int’l Primate 
Prot. League case); Robert Reinhold, Fate of Monkeys, Deformed for Science, Causes Human 
Hurt After 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1987, at A8 (relating issues of cruelty in the Silver 
Springs case). 
33 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)–(2). 
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Members of the press argued, “[t]his legislation . . . will force 
Americans to decide if speaking up for animals is worth the risk of 
being labeled a ‘terrorist,’ either in the media or in the courtroom.”34 
Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) argued that AETA  
paint[s] everyone with the broad brush of terrorism who 
might have a legitimate objection to a type of research or 
treatment of animals that is not humane. . . . This bill is 
written in such a way as to have a chilling effect on the 
exercise of peoples’ first amendment rights.35  
Long after the debates and the congressional hearings have ended, 
concerns regarding the potential enforcement of AETA against 
whistleblowers remain. After an undercover investigator associated 
with the Humane Society of the United States videotaped 
nonambulatory cows so diseased that they could not stand being 
forced to slaughter in violation of USDA regulations, the USDA 
recalled 143 million pounds of ground beef, the largest recall in 
American history.36 The author of a New York Times article expressed 
concern that because of the size of the recall and the economic harm it 
caused, AETA would be used to prosecute the investigator.37  
C. Effectuating the Legislative Intent of AETA 
A literal reading of AETA’s terms alone may proscribe the 
removal of records or animals for the purpose of whistleblowing.38 To 
date, no court has had the opportunity to interpret the Act as it 
pertains to whistleblowing, but when the opportunity arises, courts 
should read beyond AETA’s terms in order to effectuate the statute’s 
purpose.39 It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that where 
                                                                                                                 
34 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of William Potter, Journalist). 
35 152 Cong. Rec. H8593 (2006) (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich). 
36 See BETTY FUSSELL, RAISING STEAKS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AMERICAN BEEF 269 
(2008) (discussing the recall of beef due to health concerns arising from animal rights activists’ 
undercover operations). 
37 See Kim Severson, Upton Sinclair, Now Playing on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2008, at F1 (discussing the possibility of AETA litigation).  
38 See supra text accompanying notes 26–33. 
39 See Gulf States Steel Co. v. U.S., 287 U.S. 32, 45 (1932) (“When possible, every statute 
should be rationally interpreted with the view of carrying out the legislative intent.”); Hodges v. 
Rainey, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (S.C. 2000) (“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to 
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.”); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never 
Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975) (“the function of a court when dealing with a statute is to 
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”). 
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Congress has used language that is susceptible to multiple, conflicting 
meanings, courts must effectuate the intent of the legislature by 
reading beyond the statute’s plain language.40 From its inception, 
AETA was concerned solely with prohibiting violence against animal 
enterprises and their employees.41 Congress never intended to prohibit 
whistleblowing. In fact, it specifically addressed and attempted to 
remedy those portions of the statute that tended to inhibit 
whistleblowing.42 After recognizing that the term “physical 
disruption” was ambiguous and “could be construed to criminalize 
whistleblowing activity that results in a facility being shut down by 
regulators or protests,” Congress responded by including a limiting 
definition.43 Hence, the statute was never aimed at hindering 
whistleblowing, whatever its form. 
The debates and testimony surrounding the 2006 amendments 
were equally unconcerned with prohibiting whistleblowing. Rather, 
the promoters of the bill argued that the increased scope was aimed 
specifically at thwarting “domestic terrorism threats”44 and “multi-
state campaigns of intimidation.”45 AETA’s promoters argued that its 
sole purpose was preventing violent attacks by extremists, which 
could one day result in the loss of a human life.46 There is simply no 
evidence that Congress amended AEPA to inhibit whistleblowing or 
other traditionally protected activities.47 The Department of Justice 
emphasized this point when, in the course of lobbying for the 
                                                                                                                 
40 See U.S. v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that because the 
word “law” in the Lacey Act was susceptible to competing, reasonable interpretations, the court 
must look to the legislative history of the statute to determine Congress’s intended purpose in 
enacting the law to determine the proper meaning of the term). 
41 H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(I), at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805 (“Nothing 
in this subtitle shall be construed to affect or limit the exercise of any right granted by State or 
Federal whistleblower protection laws . . . .”).  
42 H.R. REP. NO. 102–498 (II), at 4 (1992) (stating that the Bill was not meant to 
encompass whistleblowing). 
43 Id.  
44 Eco-terrorism Specifically Examining the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal 
Liberation Front, Hearing Before the S Comm. on Env. and Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 41 (2005) 
(statement of John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (“The 
written testimony provided to the Committee Referred to eco-terrorism as one of the most 
serious domestic terrorism threat in the United States today . . . .”). 
45 Id. at 13. Mr. Lewis elaborated: “[O]ne of our greatest challenges has been the lack of 
Federal criminal statutes to address multi-state campaigns of intimidation. . . . Therefore, the 
existing statutes may need refinements. . . .” Id. at 39–40.  
46 Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. James M. Inhofe) [hereinafter Inhofe Statement] (“Experts 
agree that although they have not killed anyone to date, it is only a matter of time until someone 
dies as a result of ELF and ALF criminal activity.”).  
47 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. On 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5–7 
(2006) (statement of Brent McIntosh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States 
Department of Justice). 
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amendments, it assured Congress that the amendments were not 
intended to “prohibit or discourage the protected activities of 
whistleblowers, protestors, and leafleters.”48  
Despite legitimate concerns that AETA’s language renders it 
susceptible to abuse and misinterpretation, Congress did not intend to 
hinder whistleblowing or other traditionally protected activities. A 
reviewing court seeking to effectuate AETA’s intent must read 
beyond the bare terms and apply its penalties cautiously. Aside from 
the legislative intent, the fact that the USDA, animal-enterprise 
employees, and the American public rely on whistleblowers to ensure 
compliance with anti-cruelty laws and maintain the integrity of the 
food supply compels the conclusion that AETA should not be 
enforced against whistleblowers.  
II. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT, USDA ENFORCEMENT,  
AND THE PROBLEM OF STANDING 
A. Brief History of the Animal Welfare Act 
The Animal Welfare Act49 is the core piece of federal legislation 
aimed at regulating the use of millions of animals. In the early 1960s, 
the public became increasingly aware that animal dealers were 
stealing family pets and researchers were subsequently using those 
pets in experimentation. Two closely occurring events spurred the 
federal legislative push for tighter restrictions on the use of animals. 
In 1965, a United States Representative contacted an animal dealer 
about a missing Dalmatian believed to be on the dealer’s property.50 
Troubled by the dealer’s lack of concern for the animal’s welfare and 
whereabouts, he introduced a bill into Congress aimed at prohibiting 
the theft of companion animals for research.51 Then, in 1966, Life 
magazine profiled Lucky, an emaciated and frightened English 
Pointer who was purchased at auction for three dollars.52 Lucky was 
sold to a laboratory for experimentation53 and was one of 
approximately two-million dogs used for research each year,54 An 
astonishing half of these dogs were, like Lucky, family pets stolen by 
                                                                                                                 
48 Id. at 10.  
49 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006). 
50 Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Standing Under 
the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 796 (1997). 
51 Id. 
52 Stan Wayman, Concentration Camps for Dogs, LIFE, Feb. 4, 1966, at 22 (prior to the 
publication Congress had eight bills pending). 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
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professional “dognappers.”55 The article described in vivid detail the 
deplorable conditions in which dealers “simply dispose of their packs 
at auction where the going rate for dogs is 30 cents a pound. Puppies, 
often drenched in their own vomit, sell for 10 cents apiece.”56 The 
article generated more letters to Congress than any other issue at the 
time, including the Vietnam War.57  
The legislature generally conceded that state laws were incapable 
of regulating the mass quantity of animals demanded by the federal 
government’s research program.58 Fueled by public outcry and the 
pervasiveness of abuse revealed during Congressional hearings,59 
Congress enacted the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (LAWA).60 
LAWA’s stated objective was to protect owners of companion 
animals by requiring animal dealers to obtain licenses and imposing 
penalties on laboratories that purchase animals from unlicensed 
dealers.61 Ensuring minimum standards of humane treatment was a 
secondary purpose.62  
Four years after initial promulgation, Congress revisited LAWA to 
respond to the public’s concerns that it did not sufficiently protect 
animal welfare.63 That year, Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act 
of 1970 (AWA),64 which amended LAWA. In enacting the AWA, 
Congress recognized that animals have a right to certain basic 
necessities.65 To ensure that these needs were met, the Secretary of 
                                                                                                                 
55 Id. (citing estimates provided by the Humane Society of the United States). 
56 Id. 
57 EMILY STEWART LEAVITT, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF 
AMERICAN LAWS FROM 1641 TO 1968, at 48–49 (1968). 
58 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281, at 4–6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2636 
(“The demand for research animals has risen to such proportions that a system of unregulated 
dealers is now supplying hundreds of thousands of dogs, cats, and other animals to research 
facilities each year. . . . Stolen pets are quickly transported across State lines, changing hands 
rapidly . . . [and] State laws . . . proved inadequate both in the apprehending and conviction of 
the thieves who operate in the interstate operation . . . .”); see also Mendelson, supra note 50, at 
797 (discussing the inadequacy of state laws). 
59 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2635. 
60 Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the 
transportation, sale, and handling of animals intended to be used for research or 
experimentation).  
61 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2133–34.  
62 § 2131, 80 Stat. at 350 (noting that primary purpose was to protect theft of companion 
animals). 
63 See 116 Cong. Rec. 40,159 (1970) (statement of Rep. Wilmer Mizell). 
64 Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 
(2006)). 
65 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1651 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5104. The 
Act provides that “animals should be accorded the basic creature comforts of adequate housing, 
ample food and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation, sufficient ventilation, shelter from 
extremes of weather and temperature, and adequate veterinary care including the appropriate use 
of pain-killing drugs.” Id. 
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Agriculture was required to issue regulations establishing that animals 
receive “adequate housing, ample food and water, reasonable 
handling, decent sanitation, [and] sufficient ventilation.”66 The 
amendment was a self-proclaimed embodiment of Congress’s 
continuing commitment “to the ethic of kindness.”67 Despite this 
commitment, however, Congress remained reluctant to place 
significant limitations on the actual use of animals in research and 
experimentation. Under the bill, regulators did not have the power to 
interfere with research or experimentation because “the research 
scientist still holds the key to the laboratory door.”68  
Following the 1970 amendments, Congressional hearings 
continued to demonstrate widespread animal abuse.69 As a result, 
Congress further amended the AWA in 1976.70 The 1976 
amendments had three objectives: (1) to prevent animal abuse during 
transportation; (2) to expand the scope of the term “animal”; and (3) 
to curtail animal fighting for sport.71  
The last meaningful revisiting of the AWA occurred in 1985, after 
whistleblowers removed videotapes of experiments performed on 
baboons at the University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic.72 The 
videotapes revealed that researchers had developed a contraption 
designed to produce head injuries in baboons.73 Video footage 
depicted the contraption striking the skulls of alert baboons at two 
thousand times the force of gravity as researchers mocked the 
animals.74 Congress enacted the Improved Standards for Laboratory 
Animals Act (ISLAA)75 in the direct aftermath of the events.76 
                                                                                                                 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 122 CONG. REC. 2860 (1976) (statement of Rep. Thomas Foley) (arguing that, despite 
the 1970 law, “no substantial progress has been made toward the solution of [the animal abuse] 
problem”). 
70 See Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 
(1976). 
71 Id. § 2131, 90 Stat. at 417.  
72 See Head Injuries, supra note 31, at 177–80. 
73 Id. at 178. 
74 See id. 
75 Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1759, 99 Stat. 
1645 (1985) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)) (clarifying and amending the 
Animal Welfare Act in an attempt to improve the treatment of laboratory animals). 
76 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, Inc., 204 F.3d 229, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(“In 1985 Congress passed the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act amending the 
Animal Welfare Act of 1966.”) (citation omitted); DEBORAH RUDACILLE, THE SCALPEL AND 
THE BUTTERFLY: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RESEARCH AND ANIMAL PROTECTION 157 (2001) 
(“The 1985 amendments (Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act), passed in the wake 
of the University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic debacle . . . .”). 
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The ISLAA broadened the definition of “animal” and reflected 
Congress’s goal of promoting the three R’s of research: “reduction in 
the number of animals used, refinement of cruel techniques, and 
replacement of animals with plants and computer simulations.”77 The 
amendments sought to meet these goals by requiring: (1) the use of 
tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics; (2) the principal researcher 
to consider any technique likely to cause pain or distress; 
(3) veterinary consultation regarding research protocols likely to 
cause pain; and (4) the performance of only one major operation on 
an animal, unless further operations were considered a scientific 
necessity.78 The ISLAA also created Institutional Animal Care and 
Use Committees (IACUC), an internal review mechanism aimed at 
increasing the oversight and welfare of animals used in research.79 
B. The Challenges of USDA Regulation  
Since its inception, the AWA has been underenforced. Though the 
USDA is the lead federal agency charged with enforcing the AWA,80 
it has never felt fully suited for this role.81 As Secretary of Agriculture 
Orville Freeman expressed in a 1966 letter:  
In respect to animals, the functions of this Department relate 
basically to livestock and poultry. Accordingly, there is a 
question as to whether it would not be desirable that a law 
such as that in question be administered by a Federal agency 
more directly concerned and having greater expertise with 
respect to the subject than this Department.82 
In response to the proposed 1970 amendments, the USDA 
supported the impending legislation, but again expressed concerns 
about its role as the lead enforcement agency.83 The USDA attempted 
to have the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare act as 
                                                                                                                 
77 137 CONG. REC. 8533 (1991) (statement of Rep. Lee Hamilton). 
78 See S. REP. NO. 99-145, at 593 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N 731, 746. 
79 See infra text accompanying notes 130–42. 
80 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006). 
81 Letter from Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman to Senator Warren G. 
Magnuson, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce (Mar. 25, 1966) in S. REP. NO. 89-1281 
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2643. (“[T]he application of this bill should be 
limited to the care and handling of dogs and cats by dealers. The care and use of such animals 
within research facilities pose more difficult problems.”).  
82 Id. 
83 See Letter from J. Phil Campbell, Under Secretary of Agriculture, to Rep. W.R. Poage, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture (June 9, 1970), in H.R. REP. NO. 91-1651, 
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5105–06.  
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enforcer of the AWA.84 However, Congress had considered and 
rejected this idea in the previous LAWA proposals.85 Congress 
believed that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was 
incapable of enforcing the AWA because to do so would result in 
self-regulation by researchers.86 
In addition to reluctantly adopting its role as regulator of animal 
welfare, the USDA has consistently been understaffed and 
inadequately funded.87 Thus, the USDA’s lack of internal motivation 
is not the sole reason for the poor record of AWA enforcement; it is 
also the result of insufficient resources.88 There are approximately 
twenty regulated laboratories for each USDA inspector, resulting in 
fewer inspections than are necessary to sufficiently regulate the 
industry.89 The USDA recommends that each facility be inspected at 
least four times per year, but due to strained resources, facilities are 
inspected just once every one to two years.90 On the rare occasions 
when laboratories are randomly inspected, they are frequently cited 
for AWA noncompliance.91 Strained resources have contributed to the 
under enforcement and ineffectiveness of the AWA.92  
                                                                                                                 
84 Id. at 5106 (“[W]e believe that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is the 
appropriate agency to administer such an activity.”).  
85 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2648. 
86 Id. 
87 In a 1976 article, Paula Rosen stated: “[i]nspections carried out by the Department have 
often been either ineffective or nonexistent. This inadequacy is not only due to lack of 
motivation within the Department to establish a strict enforcement policy, but is also the result 
of insufficient funding to implement the necessary procedures.” See Paula Rosen, Federal 
Regulation of Zoos, 5 ENVTL. AFF. 381, 395–96 (1976) (footnote omitted). A decade later, a 
government accountability audit revealed that the AWA often went unenforced due to 
insufficient funding, inadequate training, and simply too few inspectors. See GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-85-8, THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S ANIMAL WELFARE 
PROGRAM (1985).  
88 See Joshua E. Gardner, Note, At the Intersection of Constitutional Standing, 
Congressional Citizen-Suits, and the Humane Treatment of Animals: Proposals to Strengthen 
the Animal Welfare Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 330, 331–32 (2000) (citing congressional 
testimony regarding the inadequate inspection of research facilities); Madhusree Mukerjee, 
Trends in Animal Research: Increased Concern for Animals, Among Scientists as Well as the 
Public, Is Changing the Ways in Which Animals Are Used for Research and Safety Testing, SCI. 
AM., Feb. 1997 at 92 (discussing the limited resources available to investigate these matters). 
89 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92. (noting that under enforcement of laboratories is 
well known and is illustrated by the fact that there are only sixty-nine inspectors for 1,300 
regulated laboratories). The USDA’s shortcomings are not limited to the regulation of 
laboratories. Rather, it is merely symptomatic of a general plague of under-funding. See Valerie 
Stanley, The Animal Welfare Act and USDA: Time for an Overhaul, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
103, 109 (1998) (“[The] USDA only has 87 inspectors for the entire country and there are at 
least 10,000 entities it regulates.”). 
90 Collette L. Adkins Giese, Comment, Twenty Years Wasted: Inadequate USDA 
Regulations Fail to Protect Primate Psychological Well-Being, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 221, 
242–43 (2006). 
91 In 1992, twenty-six laboratories were selected at random and inspected by the USDA. 
Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92. The Office of the Inspector General's audit of the USDA's 
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B. The Problem of Standing and the Lack of a Citizen-Suit Provision 
Private plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate standing to enforce the 
AWA against violators has further hampered AWA enforcement. 
Standing is a threshold determinant for seeking judicial intervention 
in the federal courts.93 Article III of the United States Constitution 
limits federal jurisdiction to circumstances in which an aggrieved 
party can articulate a “case or controversy.”94 In Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife,95 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking to 
demonstrate standing must satisfy three elements. First, the plaintiff 
must have suffered an injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally 
protected interest that is both actual and imminent, as well as concrete 
and particularized.96 A legally protected interest can be created by 
constitution, statute, or common law.97 In addition, the party seeking 
redress must be amongst the parties seeking judicial review.98 Second, 
the plaintiff’s injury must be causally connected, that is, fairly 
traceable, to the alleged illegal actions of the defendant.99 Third, and 
closely related to the second element, it must be likely that a 
favorable decision will redress the plaintiff’s injuries.100 Generally, 
this is a determination of whether the plaintiff has a legitimate stake 
in the outcome of the litigation.101  
                                                                                                                 
 
enforcement activities revealed that twelve of the twenty-six laboratories selected were not in 
compliance. Id. 
92 See USDA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REP. NO. 33002-4-SF, ANIMAL 
AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM INSPECTIONS OF 
PROBLEMATIC DEALERS 3 (2010), available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33002-4-
SF.pdf (reporting the USDA’s acknowledgement that the Animal Welfare Act is under enforced 
and ineffective). 
93 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517–18 (1975) (noting that standing is a “threshold 
determinant[] of the propriety of judicial intervention”). 
94 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
95 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
96 Id. at 560. 
97 See Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate 
Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1076 (1994) (discussing the 
requirements of standing and differentiating Article III from prudential standing). On numerous 
occasions, the Supreme Court has held that the legally protected interest required for Article III 
standing may exist solely by virtue of a statute. See e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 
617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”); accord Warth, 422 U.S. at 
500 (noting that the only “injury” which exists may be solely a product of statute). 
98 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972) (“[T]he injury in fact 
test . . . requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”). 
99 Lujan, 540 U.S. at 560 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 
(1976)). 
100 Id. at 561. 
101 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that whether a party has standing is 
a question of whether the party has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
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In addition to Article III standing, a plaintiff seeking to challenge 
the decisions of a federal agency must demonstrate that she has 
prudential standing.102 To demonstrate prudential standing, a plaintiff 
usually must show that she is a member of the class of individuals 
Congress intended to have the ability to challenge the agency’s 
decisions, which is generally a question of whether the potential 
plaintiff is within the “zone of interests” intended to be protected by 
the statute or regulation.103  
Traditionally, animals have been unable to satisfy the first element 
required to prove Article III standing; a legally protected interest.104 
Under the common-law approach to animals, courts treated animal 
ownership virtually the same as property ownership.105 In addition, 
animals cannot establish a procedural right to file suit because no 
                                                                                                                 
 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 
upon which the court so largely depends”). 
102 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of the statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); see also Air Courier Conference 
of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 524 (1991); Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 609 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (“A plaintiff must show that it has suffered 
injury-in-fact and that it falls within the zone-of-interests intended to be protected by the 
governing statute.”). 
103 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (for prudential standing, a plaintiff 
demonstrate that the injury “arguably fall[s] within the zone of interests protected or regulated 
by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit.”); Judicial Watch, Inc. 
v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ‘zone-of-interests’ requirement of 
prudential standing poses the question whether the plaintiff's interest is so incongruent with the 
statutory purposes as to preclude an inference that Congress might have intended such a party as 
a challenger.”). 
104 See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1333, 1359 (2000) (discussing the elements of standing). 
105 GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 35 (Tom Regan ed., 1995) 
(“for all intents and purposes, [animal ownership is] no different from the ownership of other 
sorts of personal property.”); see also Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.3d 272, 274 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2009) (“The majority of jurisdictions in the United States classify pets as personal property.”); 
Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 535 
(1998) (“[s]ince animals are property and have no rights, representatives of animals cannot 
assert the interest of animals in the judicial system.”). In addition, numerous laws identify 
specific animals as property. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 491 (West 2010) (“Dogs are 
personal property, and their value is to be ascertained in the same manner as the value of other 
property.”); W. VA. CODE 19-20-11 (2009) (“In addition to the head tax on dogs provided for in 
this article, the owner of any dog above the age of six months shall be permitted to place a value 
on such dog and have such dog assessed as personal property in the same manner and at the 
same rate as other personal property.”). The view of animals as property is also well-established 
in our common law tradition. See Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 
700 (1897) (“By the common law, as well as by the law of most, if not all, the States, dogs are 
so far recognized as property that an action will lie for their conversion or injury . . . .”); 
Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that loss 
of consortium for the death of an animal was not a legally cognizable claim because animals 
maintain a status of property under the law). 
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federal statute permits an animal to bring suit in its own name.106 
Property cannot suffer a cognizable legal injury.107 Hence, animals 
have no standing in the federal courts through statute or common law.  
Nonetheless, animals have been named as individual plaintiffs in 
several high-profile cases,108 and courts have, on occasion, suggested 
that animals can have standing. Most notably, in Padila v. Hawaii 
Dept of Land and Natural Resources,109 the court stated that “[a]s an 
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act . . . the bird 
(Loxioides bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honey-creeper family, 
also has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff 
in its own right.” In Padila, the defendants challenged the plaintiffs’ 
standing, however, and thus the Ninth Circuit did not have occasion 
to address the issue.110 But irrespective of isolated suggestions to the 
contrary, animals currently do not have standing to enforce animal-
protection laws.111 Therefore, neither an animal nor a person can seek 
judicial redress on an animal’s behalf.  
Animals are left to rely on people to sue for enforcement of 
animal-protection statutes.112 Several animal-protection statutes do 
include a citizen-suit provision, which allows people to do just that.113 
Courts, when interpreting these statutes, have found that Congress 
intended to encourage private citizens to enforce these laws and 
provided, as a measure of legislative enactment, standing to enforce 
the laws through the citizen-suit provisions.114 While citizen-suit 
                                                                                                                 
106 Sunstein, supra note 104, at 1359. 
107 See Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 
836 F. Supp. 45, 49–50 (D. Mass. 1993) (concluding and citing cases for the proposition that 
“cases in each state indicate that animals are treated as property of their owners, rather than 
entities with their own legal rights,” and finding that a dolphin did not have standing to proceed 
as a party in interest because it is property). 
108 E.g., Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir 1991); N. Spotted Owl 
v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 
(W.D. Wash. 1988).  
109 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988). 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. New England 
Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 48–49 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that the citizen-suit provisions of 
Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act provided for suits brought by 
people and not animals); Haw. Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding 
that the bird was not a “person” under the meaning of the Endangered Species Act’s citizen-suit 
provision and that it therefore did not have standing to sue). 
112 See Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & 
Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff had standing under the 
citizens’ suit provision of Endangered Species Act but noting that any alleged injury must be the 
plaintiff’s own injury as continuous harm to animals is insufficient to prove standing). 
113 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006) (providing a citizen 
suit); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (2006) (same). 
114 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding 
that Congress, in including the citizen suit provision as part of the Endangered Species Act, 
intended to encourage private citizens to enforce its provisions and holding that the plaintiffs’ 
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provisions do not dispose of Article III standing altogether, they 
expand standing to the outer boundaries of the case or controversy 
requirement of Article III by including individuals who would 
otherwise be unable to demonstrate the injury requirement.115  
In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that 
citizen-suit provisions “negate[] the zone of interest test.”116 That is, 
by virtue of a citizen-suit provision, plaintiffs acquire prudential 
standing.117 In Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps,118 the court was 
asked to determine whether plaintiffs had standing to enforce the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act under its citizen-suit provision. 
Finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the court declared, “[w]here 
an act is expressly motivated by considerations of humaneness toward 
animals, who are uniquely incapable of defending their own interests 
in court, it strikes as eminently logical to allow groups specifically 
concerned with animal welfare to invoke the aid of the courts in 
enforcing the statute.”119  
Even though the AWA was motivated by considerations of the 
humaneness towards animals, courts have consistently concluded that 
Kreps was inapposite in AWA suits because, unlike the other animal-
protection statutes, the AWA does not expressly provide for citizens’ 
suits.120 A major consequence of Congress’s failure to provide a 
                                                                                                                 
 
had standing to challenge the EPA’s use of strychnine); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 
1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that private citizens and environmental and animal 
protection groups had standing to challenge a moratorium on the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Fla. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm., 550 F. Supp. 1206, 
1208 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (“Under the citizens’ suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act, the 
Plaintiffs have standing to sue in their own names to seek the protection of this Act for an 
endangered species.”). The individual seeking to enforce a citizen suit provision must still 
satisfy the irreducible elements of standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992); see also Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 677 F. 
Supp. 2d 55, 100 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that an informational injury not a legally protected 
interest enforceable under the Endangered Species Act’s citizens’ suit provision). 
115 See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that citizen-suit provisions do not do away with constitutional requirements for 
standing altogether by extending but, rather, that it extends the Article III to maximum 
constitutional limit). 
116 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997) (holding that the citizen-suit provision of 
the Endangered Species Act sufficiently broad to negate the zone of interest test). 
117 See Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 731 F. Supp. 2d 15, 
at *4 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Plaintiffs acquire prudential standing in relation to their ESA claims 
pursuant to the citizen-suit provision of the ESA.”) (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 
(1997)). 
118 561 F.2d 1002. 
119 Id. at 1007. 
120 See Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934, 936 
(4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempts to become legal guardians of animals rescued from 
National Institutes of Health funded laboratory after whistleblowers revealed documented 
animal abuse that resulted in dozens of animal cruelty charges and the elimination of federal 
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statutory right to file suit in the AWA is that private plaintiffs are 
generally not considered to be within the zone of interests that 
Congress sought to protect.121 Likewise, plaintiffs have generally 
been unable to demonstrate that they have suffered a cognizable 
injury as a result of an AWA violation, which is also necessary for 
Article III standing.122 Thus, third parties lack standing to seek 
judicial review for the researchers’ violations of the AWA.123 
Individual plaintiffs have been more successful in challenging the 
promulgation of USDA rules than enforcing the AWA.124  
Reviewing courts generally agree that enforcement of the AWA is 
solely within the discretion of the USDA.125 Because third parties do 
not have standing to enforce AWA, private plaintiffs, including with 
personal knowledge of AWA violations, must rely on the USDA 
inspection process. Understaffing and inadequate funding, however, 
have prevented meaningful compliance with the inspection 
requirements.126 The result of the USDA’s inefficacy and third 
parties’ inability to enforce the AWA is that animal enterprises are 
left to self-regulate, directly contravening the intent of the AWA.127  
C. The Failure to Self-Regulate 
The biomedical-research industry has opposed the AWA since its 
earliest stages.128 It has disputed each amendment and every attempt 
                                                                                                                 
 
funding for the project). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See id. at 938. Numerous courts have followed this line of reasoning and come to the 
same determination. See, e.g., In Def. of Animals, et al. v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, 785 F. 
Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (concluding that animal protection workers seeking to 
challenge a zoo’s moving a gorilla did not have standing to enforce the provisions of the AWA); 
see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Inst. Animal Care and Use Comm. of 
Univ. of Or., 794 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d 817 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1991) (no 
standing to enforce alleged violations of the AWA). 
124 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(holding that plaintiff had Article III standing based on aesthetic injury as a result of observing 
primates housed in isolated conditions); Alt. Research and Dev. Found. v. Glickman, 101 F. 
Supp. 2d 7, 12 (2000) (“[I]t necessarily follows that a researcher who witness the mistreatment 
of rats in her lab must have standing.”). 
125 See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the animal welfare groups and individual citizens did not have standing to 
challenge the USDA’s enforcement of the AWA); Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 941 
(holding plaintiffs did not have standing under AWA). 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 87–92. 
127 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2648 (rejecting 
the idea that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare enforce the AWA because such 
an arrangement would lead to self-regulation by medical researchers). 
128 See Stanley, supra note 89, at 110 (noting that the National Association of Biomedical 
Research, the main lobbying group for the biomedical industry, and its predecessors consistently 
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to strengthen its provisions.129 In the first two decades, the AWA gave 
researchers substantial discretion to regulate their uses of animals.130 
But after highly publicized violations of state and federal anti-cruelty 
laws, Congress created the Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee (IACUC or Committee).131 Modeled after Institutional 
Review Boards, which ensure the ethical nature of research protocols 
in which humans are subjects,132 the IACUC is a self-regulating entity 
that oversees all aspects of the institution’s animal care and use 
program for animal research.133 Federal law mandates that institutions 
using laboratory animals create an IACUC.134 The chief executive 
officer of the institution must appoint this Committee,135 and the 
Committee must have at least one member who is a non-scientist and 
another who is unaffiliated with the institution and capable of serving 
as a representative of the community.136 The USDA requires the 
IACUC to approve procedures before they are conducted on 
animals.137 In addition, the IACUC must establish appropriate 
channels for researchers and other members of the institution to 
express grievances regarding animal mistreatment, investigate all 
complaints, and take appropriate remedial measures.138 
Nonetheless, it is widely understood research institutions have 
devoted little energy to IACUCs.139 They are rarely used and quite 
                                                                                                                 
 
opposed animal protection laws). 
129 See, e.g., Estelle A. Fishbein, What Price Mice?, 285 JAMA 939, 941 (2001) (arguing 
that proposed amendments to the AWA seeking to include mice, rats, and birds within the 
AWA’s definition of “animal” must be thwarted and further arguing that laboratories coming 
under the jurisdiction of the Public Health service should exempted from the AWA); Stanley, 
supra note 89, at 110.  
130 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1976) (describing the minimum standard requirements for 
researchers). 
131 Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1759, 99 Stat. 1650 (1985) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)). 
132 See generally The Belmont Report: Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (1979).  
133 See 9 C.F.R. § 2.31 (2010) (listing the requirements for the IACUC). 
134 Id. 
135 See id. at § 2.31(b) (“The members of each Committee shall be appointed by the Chief 
Executive Officer of the research facility”). 
136 See id. at 2.31(a)–(c). 
137 See Garrett Field & Todd A. Jackson, THE LABORATORY CANINE 48 (2007) (describing 
the IACUC’s functions and requirements); see Pierce Chow, The Functions of the Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committee, in USING ANIMAL MODELS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: A 
PRIMER FOR THE INVESTIGATOR 31, 31–37 (Pierce Chow, et al. eds., 2008) (describing a 
functioning IACUC in the Singapore Health Services). 
138 See PIERCE, supra note 135, at 36 (discussing the purpose and role of the IACUC in the 
biomedical research industry). 
139 See Rosamond Rhodes & James J. Strain, Whistle Blowing in Academic Medicine, 30 J. 
MED. ETHICS 35, 35 (2004) (noting that these committees are often ineffective due to the lack of 
institutional energy devoted). 
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often remain ineffective as a vehicle to express grievances.140 Among 
the major flaws is that the Chief Executive Officer of an IACUC 
appoints all members. This has led to criticisms that only those 
individuals willing to agree to the research are appointed to the 
IACUC.141 Moreover, while the Committees are designed to 
implement regulations, “[t]he regulations the [C]ommittees 
apply . . . are minimal and can be waived if a majority of IACUC 
members believe such action will enhance the experiment.”142 
Research institutions more often view the Committees as an 
impediment to research that must be circumvented, rather than a 
means to effective research.143 Both progressive and conservative 
groups, including those that are supportive of the use of animals in 
biomedical research, have recognized that the IACUC is an 
inadequate means of ensuring animal welfare.144 
Because IACUCs rarely perform the function for which they are 
designed, individual researchers must ensure that proper protections 
are in place, and the USDA relies on individual researchers or other 
private parties to act as individual whistleblowers.145 However, 
researchers face enormous pressures not to come forward when they 
are aware of unethical uses of animals.146 They are acculturated to be 
loyal and not to blow the whistle on colleagues and other 
researchers.147 This is not to imply that researchers never come 
forward. There are always individuals who resist external and internal 
pressures in an attempt to alert the public to the existence of 
                                                                                                                 
140 See id. (noting that due to the minimal amount of effort devoted by these committees, 
they often remain ineffective). 
141 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP ET AL, What Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, in THE 
HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL CHOICE 197 (2d ed. 2008) (providing 
examples where full committee review has been avoided). 
142 DAVID NIBERT, ANIMAL RIGHTS/HUMAN RIGHTS: ENTANGLEMENTS OF OPPRESSION 
AND LIBERATION 178 (2002). 
143 See id. (noting that the members often regulate themselves). 
144 See FRANCIONE, supra note 105, at 218 (“[N]ot only do more progressive organizations 
regard USDA enforcement as ineffective, but so do organizations that, by and large, supported 
biomedical research using animals.”); 1 THE EXPERIMENTAL ANIMAL IN BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH 46 (Bernard E. Rollin & M. Lynne Kesel eds., 1990) (noting that the public remains 
skeptical of the 1985 amendment to the Animal Welfare Act because of its “ineffective 
enforcement”).  
145 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (noting that under this framework, USDA inspectors 
must rely on whistleblowers). 
146 See Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 35 (noting that whistleblowers are often 
punished for coming forward). 
147 See T. Faunce et al., Supporting Whistleblowers in Academic Medicine: Training and 
Respecting the Courage of Professional Conscience, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 40, 41 (2004) (arguing 
that despite legislative and other measures, many researchers feel that they must adhere to a 
code of silence with respect to misconduct or they will be viewed as traitors to their colleagues); 
Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 37 (noting that to disclose is often to betray).  
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wrongdoings.148 When these researchers do come forward as 
whistleblowers, however, they “are ostracised, pressured to drop 
allegations, and threatened with counterallegations. They lose 
desirable assignments, have their research support reduced and their 
promotions and raises denied. Their contracts are not renewed, and 
they are fired.”149 Although retaliatory acts for disclosure of AWA 
violations are prohibited by law,150 the USDA rarely enforces these 
protections.151 Adding to the problem, courts have held that, because 
the AWA was not enacted for the special benefit of whistleblowers, 
whistleblowers do not have a private cause of action for retaliation.152 
Thus, the protections afforded by law are illusory.153 
As a result, animal-protection advocates play a unique role as 
whistleblowers under this framework.154 The USDA is incapable of 
adequately investigating research institutions.155 The USDA, 
therefore, relies on whistleblowers to come forward with knowledge 
of AWA abuses.156 In order to come forward with information that 
can change the misdirection of research, researchers are often forced 
to go outside of the institution itself “because their own institutions 
prefer[] sweeping their dirt under the rug.”157 One of the principle 
                                                                                                                 
148 See Stefan P. Kruszewski, Commentary, Why We Whistleblowers Are Passionate in 
Our Convictions, 2 PLOS MED. 811, 811 (2005), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/ 
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0020281 (“For me, whistleblowing . . . has a 
human face and tangible features. It is the face of children and adults who have been injured or 
killed by misrepresented pharmaceuticals.”); Usman Jaffer & Alan E.P. Cameron, Deceit and 
Fraud in Medical Research, 4 INT'L J. SURGERY 122, 125 (2006) (noting that most instances of 
fraud are detected by colleagues and arguing for greater whistleblower protections in medical 
research). 
149 Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 35; see also Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 
(discussing the fact that the U.S.D.A. can offer few assurances to those who come forward with 
complaints against researchers for violations of the Animal Welfare Act and detailing examples 
of researchers at top institutions who were discharged after revealing violations of colleagues). 
150 Animal Welfare Act, 9 C.F.R. § 2.32(c)(4) (2004) (“No facility employee, Committee 
member, or laboratory personnel shall be discriminated against or be subject to any reprisal for 
reporting violations or standards under the Act.”). 
151 See FRANCIONE, supra note 105, at 214 (noting that while the USDA recommends four 
visits to each laboratory each year, it is only able to visit a facility around once per year, and that 
this undermines enforcement); Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (noting that due to the USDA’s 
shortage of investigators, “inspectors rely on whistleblowers” to come forward and reveal 
incriminating information). 
152 See Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Tr. of N.Y. Univ., No. 96 CIV. 5997(JFK), 1998 WL 
474084, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1998) (holding that no private caused of action existed for 
retaliation after researcher revealed AWA violations). 
153 Id. 
154 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (explaining that the possibility provides an outlet for 
researchers to act as whistleblowers and prevents researchers from violating the AWA). 
155 Id. 
156 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (noting that inspectors rely on whistleblowers). 
157 Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 38; see also id. (describing a number of instances 
of research misconduct and then discussing the manner in which the institutions chose to 
conceal rather than correct the information). 
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manner by which researchers are able to act as whistleblowers 
without placing their reputation at risk is to provide information to 
animal-welfare organizations.158 The prospect of this type of 
announcement to animal-rights organization provides an incentive for 
researchers follow protocols because once the information is revealed 
to animal-rights organizations, unannounced inspections are soon to 
follow.159 Violations revealed during these unannounced inspections 
can spell the end for all funding on the project.160 Very frequently it is 
the animal-protection groups who provide information to the USDA 
inspectors, who then enforce the AWA.161 USDA inspectors, 
individual researchers, and the American public have come to rely on 
animal-protection groups to reveal detailed information.162 If the court 
applied AETA to whistleblowers because they are in possession of 
property that interferes with the operation of an animal enterprise it 
would cut off the flow of vital information and have ruinous 
consequences.  
III. FACTORY FARMS, SLAUGHTERHOUSES, AND  
POULTRY PROCESSING PLANTS 
A. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA)163 is the primary 
federal law charged with regulating the inner workings of factory 
farms, slaughterhouses, and processing plants. Congress passed the 
HMSA in 1958, at the height of public concern regarding 
slaughterhouse cruelty.164 During four days of congressional 
                                                                                                                 
158 See id. at 35 (noting the IACUC model allows “outside forces to support the desired 
behaviour”); Alex Nixon, Animal-Rights Issues at MPI Have Been Fixed, USDA Says, 
KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, July 25, 2008, at A7, available at http://www.mlive.com/business/ 
kzgazette/index.ssf?/base/business-5/1216997435311050.xml&coll=7 (describing how animal 
rights organization alerted USDA of suspected violations after activists were tipped off by 
whistleblowers within the company). 
159 See Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 37 (noting that a complaint by an outside 
researcher to a whistleblower organization can have ruinous consequences). 
160 See, e.g., id. (discussing loss of funding); Head Injuries, supra note 31, at 181 (noting 
that funding for a major research project was cut after whistleblowers revealed videos of 
documented animal abuse); Kilpatrick, supra note 32, at A15 (discussing the loss of National 
Institutes of Health funding after whistleblowers revealed inhumane conditions at a laboratory). 
161 See, e.g., Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (quoting Harvey McKelvey of the USDA as 
stating that the USDA and NIH rely on groups like PETA to infiltrate labs and produce detailed 
histories of the noncompliance with research mandates); Nixon, supra note 158, at A7 
(discussing an animal-rights group’s report to the USDA regarding a research facility’s AWA 
violations). 
162 See generally Mukerjee, supra note 88 (detailing the concern for animals among the 
public and scientific community). 
163 Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862 (codified as amended 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2006)). 
164 Id.; see also William M. Blair, Humane Appeals Swamp Congress: Senate Hearing on 
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testimony on the proposed humane methods of slaughter, the 
conditions of a typical American slaughterhouse were described in 
harrowing detail: 
a long line of helpless, healthy, fully conscious hogs [and] 
sheep, cruelly shackled and dangling from one leg, twisting, 
squirming, and screaming in agony as they approach the 
executioner . . . . [A] close observer might have noticed a 
hideously gruesome elongation of that poor shackled leg as a 
bone snapped, or the joint pulled from its socket. . . . [T]heir 
agonized screams smothered as they dropped mercilessly, 
still conscious into a vat of scalding water.165  
The testimony regarding cattle was similar.166 Before they were 
shackled and taken to slaughter, cattle were struck in the skull with a 
sledgehammer.167 Sometimes the cattle were rendered unconscious. 
Often, however, the blows were misdirected and the animal was 
merely disfigured or maimed.168 Those animals that remained 
conscious through bludgeoning were gouged with meat hooks and 
hoisted, left to have entire limbs ripped from their bodies as they 
writhed in agony.169 On August 27, 1958, over strong objections from 
the slaughter industry, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the 
HMSA into law.170 The HMSA’s primary requirement was that 
“animals [be] . . . rendered insensible to pain” before slaughter.171 
                                                                                                                 
 
Livestock Slaughter Bill Stirs Wide Interest and Mail Deluge, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1958, at 84 
(like the AWA in 1966, during the period that the HMSA was pending, Congress received more 
letters about it than any other issue). The issue had been alive for several years. Humane 
slaughter bills had circulated in Congress since 1955. See 85 CONG. REC. 15,381 (1958) 
(statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey) (noting that he had introduced the first humane slaughter 
bill into Congress in 1955).  
165 Humane Slaughtering of Livestock: Hearings on S. 1213, S. 1497, and H.R. 8308 
Before S. Comm. of Agric. and Forestry, 85th Cong. 67 (1958) [hereinafter HMSA Hearings] 
(statement of Madeline Bemelmans, President, Society for Animal Protection Legislation) 
(reading the letter of W.P. Holcombe, a retired meat inspector, into the record). 
166 Id. at 67. 
167 See HMSA Hearings, supra note 165, at 30 (statement of Fred Myers, Executive 
Director, Humane Society of the United States) (discussing the prevalence of the sledgehammer 
as the primary mechanism for “stunning,” which often fails to render the animal unconscious 
and stating that many of the animals were struck as many as ten times); see also id. at 78 
(statement of Christine Stevens, President, Animal Welfare Institute) (stating that she had 
personally witnessed thirteen blows from a sledgehammer delivered to a single animal). 
168 See id. at 68 (statement of Madeline Bemelmans, President, Society for Animal 
Protection Legislation) (describing that haphazard swinging of the sledgehammer often failed to 
render the animal unconscious and often left the animal with a “preliminary broken snout, an ear 
sheered off, or an eye gouged out”). 
169 See id. at 78 (statement of Christine Stevens, President, Animal Welfare Institute) 
(describing the torturous conditions she witnessed at slaughterhouses). 
170 See 104 CONG. REC. 19,717 (1958) (record of signing the bill into law); HMSA 
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B. USDA Enforcement of the HMSA 
The USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is 
responsible for regulating the inner workings of factory farms, 
slaughterhouses, and processing plants.172 Enforcement of the HMSA 
often overlaps enforcement of federal food safety regulations, both of 
which are regulated by FSIS.173 The FSIS has recently been the 
subject of increased scrutiny for its failure to consistently enforce the 
HMSA and food safety regulations.174 Sixty years after it was enacted 
into law, the HMSA is still not regularly enforced, and slaughterhouse 
conditions remain similar to those described during the 1958 
congressional hearings.175 The HMSA’s mandate that animals be 
rendered “insensible to pain” often goes unenforced.176 Reports reveal 
that animals have remained conscious during slaughtering, sometimes 
moving their eyes and attempting to walk as the flesh is stripped from 
their bodies.177 There are further indications that these occurrences 
happen “on a daily basis” in “plants all over the United States.”178 
                                                                                                                 
 
Hearings, supra note 165, at 175 (statement of L. Blaine Liljenquist, Vice President, Western 
States Meat Packers Ass’n, Inc,) (noting that slaughterhouses are “strongly opposed to the 
compulsory features of these bills”); see generally HMSA Hearings, supra note 165, at 131–42 
(statement of C.H. Eshbaugh, Consultant, American Meat Institute) (defending slaughterhouse 
techniques and stating opposition to the bills). 
171 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006). 
172 See 21 U.S.C. § 603(b) (2006) (requiring the USDA to make humane slaughter 
inspections). See also Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Weaknesses in USDA Enforcement 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (statement of Lisa Shames, Director, Natural Resources and Environment) 
[hereinafter Enforcement], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/ 
Domestic_Policy/2010/030410_Horse_Slaughter/030110_111th_DP_Lisa_Shames_GAO_0304
10.pdf (discussing the USDA and FSIS’s role in enforcing the HMSA). 
173 See Enforcement, supra note 172, at 2 (noting that FSIS “cannot track HMSA 
inspection funds separately from the inspection funds spent on food safety activities”).  
174 See, e.g., Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Weakness in USDA Enforcement, Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (statement of Wayne Pacelle, the Humane Society of the United States) [hereinafter 
Pacelle Testimony], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Domestic_ 
Policy/2010/030410_Horse_Slaughter/030310_111th_DP_Wayne_Pacelle_030410.pdf 
(describing undercover inspections performed by the Humane Society of the United States and 
proposing regulatory reforms). 
175 See id. at 2 (describing hidden video that showed animals being kicked, electrocuted, 
and skinned alive).  
176 See Joby Warrick, ‘They Die Piece by Piece’: In Overtaxed Plants, Humane Treatment 
of Cattle Is Often a Battle Lost, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Piece by Piece] 
(detailing repeat violations at dozens of slaughterhouses); Joby Warrick, An Outbreak Waiting 
to Happen: Beef-Inspection Failures Let in a Deadly Microbe, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2001, at A1 
(describing how USDA failures allow microbes such as E-Coli to enter meat packages and 
sicken those that consume it). 
177 See Piece by Piece, supra note 176, at A1 (describing how a slaughterhouse worker 
strips off flesh from the bodies of cattle as they move their eyes and attempt to walk). 
178 Piece by Piece, supra note 176, at A10 (quoting Lester Friedlander, a former 
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Recent investigations have revealed an abundance of HMSA 
violations at major American slaughtering facilities. These include 
cows being rammed with forklifts, electrocuted, chained and dragged 
behind heavy machinery, prodded in the eyes, tortured with high-
pressure hoses to simulate drowning, as well as calves less than a 
week old shocked with electrical prods as many as thirty times and 
doused with water to increase electrical shocks.179 Other videos 
obtained by animal-welfare and animal-rights organizations clearly 
revealed that animals were not rendered insensible to pain before 
slaughter, including one instance where a calf remained vocal after its 
head had been halfway removed.180 
In response to numerous reports of abuse, the government recently 
commissioned a study to determine the cause behind FSIS’s poor 
enforcement record.181 The study analyzed the responses of randomly 
selected USDA inspectors at 257 slaughter plants and a sample of 
FSIS noncompliance reports for the 2005 through 2009 fiscal years.182 
The results of the study confirmed that the HMSA is inconsistently 
enforced.183 The report also revealed that inconsistent enforcement is, 
in part, the result of inspector ignorance and a lack of training.184 
According to the government’s data, only a minority of inspectors 
would take appropriate regulatory action “in response to excessive 
beating or prodding,” which, according to FSIS guidelines, may 
warrant suspension of plant operations.185 A majority of inspectors 
considered themselves undertrained in identifying and responding to 
“double stunning,” “beating,” electrical prodding,” “electrical 
stunning failure,” and “slips and falls.”186 In addition, more than forty 
                                                                                                                 
 
government inspector and veterinarian). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-
247, HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT: USDA HAS ADDRESSED SOME PROBLEMS BUT 
STILL FACES ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES 4 (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo. 
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:d04247.pdf (finding 553 violations of federal law 
at 272 facilities). 
179 See Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 1–2 (describing undercover investigations 
that documented horrendous conditions at slaughterhouses). 
180 Id. at 2. 
181 See Enforcement, supra note 172, at 1 (indicating that, due to recent violations, 
Congress held hearings on March 4, 2010, to probe efforts taken by the United States 
Department of Agriculture to enforce the HMSA). 
182 Id.  
183 Id. Other government-produced reports have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NONAMBULATORY LIVESTOCK AND THE 
HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT, 45 (2009), available at http://www.national 
aglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22819.pdf (noting that previous studies concluded that HMSA 
enforcement was inconsistent). 
184 Enforcement, supra note 172, at 2.  
185 Id. at 3. 
186 Id. at 4 & fig.2. 
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percent of inspectors considered themselves undertrained and in need 
of additional guidance in the humane-handling enforcement of 
“animal sensibility” and “sensible animal on bleed rail,” which is 
whether the animal is sensible during slaughter.187 Thus, in some 
respects, poor HMSA enforcement is simply the result of inspector 
and USDA incompetence. 
While underenforcement of the HMSA is partially the result of 
ignorance, other contributing factors are less benign. On numerous 
occasions, inspectors have been observed directly participating in the 
animal abuse.188 Undercover video investigations revealed USDA 
inspectors laughing as sick calves, covered in their own excrement, 
were mocked and thrown against trailer walls.189 Other footage has 
revealed USDA inspectors failing to act when faced with serious 
violations. In one instance, a USDA inspector observed a worker 
attempting to skin a live calf but failed to intervene.190 The inspector 
simply watched the abuse and informed the worker that if another 
inspector saw the abuse the plant would have to be shut down.191 In 
other footage, the FSIS inspector instructed the undercover 
investigator not to tell him if a live calf was in a pile of dead calves 
because, “I’m not supposed to know. I could shut them down for 
that.”192 
C. Retaliation for Disclosure 
Individuals within the industry who attempt to reveal violations are 
frequently met with swift and strong retaliatory actions. Laborers in 
these industries cannot be expected to regularly step forward and 
reveal instances of cruelty because of increased deportation threats.193 
These industries have, in many respects, effectively shielded 
themselves from exposure by almost exclusively hiring 
undocumented workers who persist in illegal conduct under the 
constant threat of deportation.194 The enterprises with the worst 
                                                                                                                 
187 Id. 
188 See Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 1–2 (recounting examples of USDA 
inspectors engaging in animal cruelty). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
193 See David Griffith, Food Processing, in IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA TODAY: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 127 (James Louckey et al. eds., 2006) (noting that since 2001, factory farms, 
meatpacking plants, and poultry facilities, all of which depend heavily on undocumented 
laborers, have increased threats of deportation against those who seek to speak out against the 
company). 
194 See 2 CRITICAL FOOD ISSUES: PROBLEMS AND STATE-OF-THE-ART SOLUTIONS 
WORLDWIDE 35 (Lynn Walter ed., 2009) (noting that labor laws are consistently broken and the 
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records of food-safety and animal-cruelty violations have long been 
the target of immigration officials.195 Workers in these industries who 
attempt to come forward often face the risk of retaliation in the most 
extreme form.196  
USDA inspectors also have strong incentives not to come forward 
with reports of violations.197 Dr. Dean Wyatt, the supervisory public 
health veterinarian for FSIS198 and the supervisory veterinarian at 
Seaboard Farms in Oklahoma, witnessed serious violations, including 
“[c]onscious pigs shackled to the conveyor line, having their throats 
slit while kicking and squealing” and animals crushed to death as they 
were unloaded from trucks, and numerous unprovoked beatings.199 
When Dr. Wyatt attempted to enforce compliance, he was 
reprimanded by the USDA, instructed to devote less time to humane 
handling, temporarily demoted, and ultimately transferred to 
Bushway Packing, a calf slaughtering plant in Western Vermont.200  
Dr. Wyatt witnessed similar abuses at Bushway Packing. Cattle 
were chaotically shot numerous times in the head with bolt guns, 
leaving them writhing in pain; animals less than a week old and too 
dehydrated to stand were dragged on the ground or thrown across 
rooms or into stalls; and infant calves were haphazardly stunned with 
electrical prods and unnecessarily beaten.201 When Dr. Wyatt 
protested the abuses, he was again reprimanded.202 While the USDA 
                                                                                                                 
 
threat of deportation consistently reinforced in so that undocumented laborers will accept 
illegally low wages, will not speak with union reps, and will acquiesce to the status quo). 
195 See, e.g., Brad Knickerbocker, Egg Recall: Supplier Reported to Have History of 
Health, Safety Violations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 22, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 
16748714 (noting that the supplier of eggs and chickens in the 14-state recall of 450,000 eggs 
believed to be contaminated with salmonella has a long history of citations for health, safety, 
and employment violations, including the hiring of undocumented immigrants, which resulted in 
immigration raids). In 2003, just months after a paying a $130,000 fine for animal cruelty, the 
egg supplier pled guilty to knowingly hiring illegal immigrants. The Today Show: 
Congressional Investigation Now Under Way into Egg Recall: Former Labor Secretary Robert 
Reich Weighs in, (NBC television broadcast Aug. 24, 2010). 
196 See CRITICAL FOOD ISSUES, supra note 192, at 35 (detailing the retaliation threats 
against workers who come forward with information about violations). 
197 See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Weakness in USDA Enforcement, Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(statement of Dr. Dean Wyatt, FSIS Supervisory Public Health Veterinarian) [hereinafter Wyatt 
Testimony], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10487t.pdf (testifying about retaliatory 
actions taken against FSIS officials for revealing food safety and criminal violations). 
198 See Slaughterhouse Whistleblower Reveals Inhumane Animal Treatment, Food Integrity 
Violations, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Mar. 04, 2010), http://www.whistleblower. 
org/press/press-release-archive/381-slaughterhouse-whistleblower-reveals-inhumane-animal-
treatment-food-integrity-violations [hereinafter Whistleblower]. 
199 Id; see also Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 2–5 (describing the same events).  
200 Whistleblower, supra note 198; Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 6–8. 
201 See Whistleblower, supra note 198.  
202 Id. 
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refused to bring charges against the plant for its numerous, severe 
violations, the USDA retaliated against Wyatt for disclosing the 
violations by requiring him to attend remedial training, which was 
made public in a newsletter circulated throughout the industry that 
caused substantial damage to Wyatt’s reputation.203 
D. The Link Between Animal Abuse and Food Safety  
Concerns about FSIS’s enforcement record have risen sharply in 
light of increased awareness of the link between animal cruelty and 
food safety. Downed cattle, those too sick to stand, have a 
significantly increased risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
infection, or “mad cow disease,” and food-borne pathogens, including 
E. Coli. and Salmonella.204 After a downer cow in Washington State 
tested positive for mad cow disease in early 2004, the USDA began 
implementing regulations prohibiting the slaughter of downed cows 
for human consumption.205 The meat industry has challenged those 
regulations that seek to remove downer cows or other diseased 
animals from the food supply.206 While industry officials were unable 
to overturn the laws and regulations, they found inventive ways to 
circumvent enforcement.207 Cattle too sick to stand have routinely 
been electrically prodded and stunned, pushed, sprayed with hoses, 
kicked, or rammed with forklifts, or chained and dragged behind 
heavy machinery to cause temporary movement to avoid a 
                                                                                                                 
203 See Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 7 (discussing that the plant manager filed 
formal complaints against him for harassment and that he was forced to undergo remedial 
measures); Whistleblower, supra note 198 (discussing the retaliatory acts taken by the USDA 
against Wyatt following his disclosure of the plant’s violations). 
204 See C. M. Byrne, Characterization of Escherichia Coli O157:H7 from Downer and 
Healthy Dairy Cattle in the Upper Midwest Region of the United States, 69 APPLIED & ENVTL. 
MICROBIOLOGY 4683, 4683 (2003) (300% greater prevalence of E. Coli. in downer cattle than 
healthy cattle); BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or Mad Cow Disease), CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse/ (discussing the 
causes of BSE); Press Release, USDA, FSIS Publishes Final Rule Prohibiting Processing of 
“Downer” Cattle (Jul. 12, 2007) available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_events/ 
NR_071207_01/index.asp (discussing USDA final rule on prohibition against downer cows 
entering the food supply). 
205 See Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food Requirements 
for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle, 9 C.F.R. pts. 309–11, 318–19 (outlining 
the regulation changes made in response to the events in Washington); see also Baur v. 
Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff had standing to challenge 
USDA regulations permitting introduction of downer cows into food supply because plaintiff 
suffered injury-in-fact based on increased risk of contracting illness from diseased animals). 
206 See, e.g., Nat'l Meat Ass’n. v. Brown, No. 1:08-cv-01963 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 426213 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2009) (challenging California law prohibiting the use of downed cows for 
human consumption), vacated, 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010). 
207 See Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Schafer, No. 1:08-cv-00337-HHK (D.D.C. 2008) 
(challenging regulation based on the lack of public notice under 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et. seq.). 
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determination that the cow is a downer unfit for human 
consumption.208  
Federal and state governments have tried to remove downer cows 
from the food supply in a two-fold attempt to promote humane 
treatment to animals and create a safer food supply for the American 
public.209 Recognizing that slaughterhouses and processing plants 
used these tactics to circumvent the rule, the federal government, as 
well as several states, issued new regulations and enacted additional 
legislation aimed at closing this loophole.210 Once again, the factory 
farming, slaughtering, and processing industries have opposed these 
measures.211 
E. The Role of Whistleblowers 
Because the meat industry has refused to self-regulate, laborers 
face an uncertain future if they come forward, and inspectors are 
retaliated against for properly revealing violations. Thus, it is 
incumbent upon whistleblowers unaffiliated with the facility to 
preserve the integrity of America’s food supply and reveal instances 
of animal cruelty. News reports of large-scale food recalls and plant 
closures as a result of substandard conditions are common.212 In the 
months of April and May of 2008 alone, undercover investigators 
revealed egregious violations in Texas, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, 
and Maryland.213 In August 2009, undercover investigators at 
Bushway Packing in Vermont revealed violations so extreme that, 
upon release of the footage, the plant was closed.214 Then in May 
2010, undercover investigators revealed similar violations in Ohio.215 
                                                                                                                 
208 See Complaint at 3–4, Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Schafer, No. 1:08-cv-00337-HHK 
(D.D.C. 2008).  
209 See, e.g., Press Release, USDA, Agric. Sec’y Ed Schafer Announces Plan to End 
Exceptions to Animal Handling Rule (May 20, 2008), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/ 
portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2008/05/0131.xml (announcing proposed 
rule to ban all non-ambulatory cattle from food supply). 
210 See, e.g., Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25990 
(West 2010) (removing all downer cows from the food supply). 
211 See Nat’l Meat Assoc., 2009 WL 426213 (challenging California law prohibiting the 
use of downed cows for human consumption), see also Press Release, Humane Soc’y of the 
U.S., Meat Indus. Seeks to Overturn Cal. Law Barring Sick, Disabled Farm Animals from Food 
Supply, (Jan. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Humane Soc’y Press Release] available at 
http://www.hsus.org/press_and_publications/press_releases/meat_industry_seeks_to_overturn 
_downer_ban_012709.html (describing the meat industry’s attempts to overturn legislation 
aimed at prohibiting the use of downer cows). 
212 See Fussell, supra note 36, at 269 (noting that in June 2007, the California based 
Vernon Food Group recalled 5.7 million pounds of E. Coli. contaminated beef after reports of 
illnesses surfaced in six Western states). 
213 See Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 1. 
214 See Slaughterhouse Co-Owner Surrenders on Animal Cruelty Charge, Burlington (Vt.) 
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No events generated more publicity than the video footage 
obtained when an undercover investigator associated with the 
Humane Society of the United States gained access to the 
Hallmark/Westland plant in Chino, California.216 When footage of the 
abuse surfaced, the USDA recalled 143 million pounds of ground 
beef, the largest recall in American history.217 Had this video never 
surfaced, the impact on the food supply could have been disastrous. 
Hallmark/Westland is one of the top two suppliers of beef to the 
National School Lunch Program.218 The 143 million pounds of 
recalled meat was destined for children’s lunches in forty-seven 
states.219 Following the video’s release, journalists and citizen watch 
groups speculated that had the whistleblower been affiliated with an 
organization less prominent or mainstream than the Humane Society 
of the United States, charges might have been brought under 
AETA.220 Clearly, these and similar activities, regardless of the 
economic harms they might cause to the industry or the enterprise, are 
not the activities that AETA’s drafters intended to prohibit.221  
CONCLUSION 
While AETA’s terms alone could conceivably prohibit certain acts 
of whistleblowing, this was not its intended purpose. Congress’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
Free Press, Aug. 10, 2009, available at 2010 WLNR 15986965 (reporting that co-owner of 
Bushway Packing Company surrendered to Vermont law enforcement after undercover Human 
Society videos revealed that he was excessively electrocuting calves prior to slaughter, which 
led to the plant’s closing); see also Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 2–3. (discussing 
Bushway videos) and Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 6–8 (discussing the cruelty he 
witnessed as FSIS veterinarian at Bushway). 
215 See Holly Zachariah, Farm Owner Won’t Face Animal Abuse Charges, Columbus 
Dispatch, Jul. 6, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news 
/stories/2010/07/06/cow-abuse-charges.html (describing how an activist went undercover on a 
dairy farm in Marysville, Ohio captured images of an employee “viciously beating and abusing 
cows and calves,” which led to 12 counts of animal cruelty). 
216 See Carla Hall, Career Ark of an Animal Defender, L.A. Times, Jul. 19, 2008, at A1 
(discussing the undercover investigations at Hallmark/Westland). 
217 See Fussell, supra note 36, at 269. 
218 Humane Soc’y Press Release, supra note 211.  
219 See Fussell, supra note 36, 269; USDA Announces Ban on Downer Cattle, Closing 
Loophole, Humane Soc’y of the U. S. (May 20, 2008), http://www.hsus.org/farm/news/our 
news/usda_announces_downer_ban_052008.html (noting that on January 31, 2008, the USDA 
urged schools in 36 states to stop serving the contaminated meat but further noting that without 
identification and early notice the meat would have effected 47 states). 
220 See Severson, supra note 37, at F3 (questioning whether the tremendous economic 
damages caused by the recall would lead to prosecution and suggesting that had the activist been 
tied to PETA or with less public support than the Humane Society of the United States, 
prosecutions under AETA might have ensued). 
221 See text accompanying supra notes 34–44 (discussing the scope of AETA’s 
prohibitions). 
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stated objective in enacting AETA was to eliminate domestic 
terrorism threats. AETA’s legislative history clearly reveals that it 
was never intended to inhibit whistleblowing, and its drafters 
attempted to clarify those aspects of the statute most likely to deter 
whistleblowing. A court seeking to effectuate the full intent of the 
statute must be mindful of this history and apply its penalties 
cautiously. Any restrictions on whistleblowers could have far-
reaching consequences. The USDA, animal-enterprise employees, 
and the American public rely on whistleblowers to ensure that anti-
cruelty laws are complied with and that the integrity of the American 
food supply is preserved. 
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